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CPR 1(4)(2)(e) requires the court to encourage potential litigants to use an ADR 
procedure where appropriate.  The court has adopted a number of means to encourage the 
use of ADR processes: ranging from education and publicity to more robust approaches 
such as criticism, court orders and, the ultimate weapon, the threat of an adverse costs 
award1.  According to the case of Halsey v Milton Keynes General Trust NHS2, it is 
appropriate to award adverse costs where a successful party at court has unreasonably 
refused (at the request of the unsuccessful party or the suggestion of the court) to go to 
mediation.  Thus, the successful party may face not only his own costs of the action but 
also the costs of his defeated opponent.  According to Sir Anthony Clarke MR, ‘such 
cases should be very few and far between’3.  However, research conducted on two 
mediation programmes in the Central London County Court suggests that the threat of an 
adverse costs award acted as an impetus for a number of individuals who took part in a 
mediation process4.  This paper explores the possibility that the court’s role in 
encouraging ADR, at least in relation to the use of adverse costs awards, has the potential 
to conflict with an individual’s right of access to a court (an aspect of the right to a fair 
trial) under Article 6(1) ECHR. 
 
In this context there are three potential situations where an individual may argue that the 
Article 6(1) right has been prevented or restricted.  This may occur where a) an individual 
has settled the claim in an ADR procedure and, as a result, is unable to pursue a claim 
through the courts; b) following an unsuccessful ADR process an individual runs out of 
funds to advance the claim through the courts; c) an individual has successfully brought 
or defended the claim through the courts but adverse costs are awarded for unreasonable 
refusal to undertake an ADR process.  In situations a) and b) the allegation would be that 
the threat of adverse costs led the individual to undertake an ADR procedure and that, as 
a result, (s)he has been effectively denied the opportunity to pursue the claim through the 
courts (Golder v United Kingdom, Airey v United Kingdom5) either because of settlement 
at the ADR procedure or because the individual exhausted funds at that stage.  In 
situation c), the claim would be that the imposition of an adverse costs award has denied 
the party concerned effective access to the courts (Steel & Morris v United Kindom6). 
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I  EFFECTIVE DENIAL OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE A CLAIM 
THROUGH THE COURTS (SITUATIONS A) AND B)) 
 
In raising an Article 6(1) challenge in relation to situations a) and b) an individual would 
need to address two key questions: first, whether, in undertaking an ADR procedure, 
(s)he has waived his right of access to a court and, secondly, if not, whether the use of an 
adverse costs award in this context is within the state’s margin of appreciation.   In 
relation to the first issue, the applicant would need to counter two inter-linked arguments: 
1) that (s)he has had the opportunity to go to court but has chosen, instead, to make use of 
an alternative process; and 2) in doing so (s)he has waived his/her right of access to a 
court.  Where an individual has undertaken an ADR procedure, it is difficult to deny that 
there has been the opportunity to continue the court litigation process.  A refusal to 
undergo an ADR procedure does not preclude the individual from subsequently pursuing 
the claim through the courts.  However, in situations a) and b) it is the very undertaking 
of the ADR procedure that prevents access to the courts either where the individual 
reaches a settlement agreement as a result (which is, after all the aim of the ADR process 
– but in which case proceedings are generally barred) or where the litigant is unable to 
take no further action due to failure of funds.  The key to a successful application here is, 
therefore, whether the individual has waived his right of access to a court due to 
submission to an ADR procedure.   
 
A  Waiver and the Right of Access to a Court 
 
There are four criteria to be satisfied in relation to a successful defence of waiver under 
Article 6(1): 
 
1) the right must be capable of waiver 
2) the right must be waived in an unequivocal manner 
3) where a waiver is considered unequivocal it must be accompanied by sufficient 
guarantees commensurate to the importance of the right waived 
4) the waiver must not be tainted by constraint 
 
1) The right must be capable of waiver 
 
The right of access under Article 6(1) is not an absolute right and the ECtHR has 
recognised that waiver of this right does not offend against the Convention.  There is no 
compulsion for an individual to bring a civil claim through the courts so there can be no 
difficulty for an individual to choose to take his dispute to an ADR procedure.  Indeed the 
ECtHR has recognised in Deweer v Belgium7 that there may be ‘undeniable advantages 
for the individual concerned as well as for the administration of justice’8 in utilising such 
procedures (although the Court did not enunciate what it perceived those advantages to 
be). 
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2) The right must be waived in an unequivocal manner   
 
To satisfy this aspect the waiver can be express or tacit.  The ECtHR has held that 
voluntary submission to an ADR procedure amounts to an unequivocal waiver of the 
right – this does not need to be express, the act of submitting to the process amounts to a 
tacit waiver (Suovaniemi v Finland9).  However, knowledge appears to be an important 
feature here10.  If an individual is unaware that a settlement reached through an ADR 
procedure will generally prevent litigation of the same point, then that lack of knowledge 
may prove fatal to a claim that the right of access to court has been waived. 
 
3) It must be accompanied by sufficient guarantees commensurate to the importance of 
the right waived   
 
This aspect has received little discussion in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and hence 
little guidance is given, either as to what amounts to sufficient guarantees, or as to how to 
weigh the importance of the Article 6(1) right.  In Pfeifer v Austria11, the ECtHR 
considered whether an applicant’s express waiver of his right to an impartial tribunal was 
accompanied by sufficient safeguards.  There was no legislative provision permitting 
such waiver, the applicant had been unaccompanied by his legal representative when 
agreeing to waive this right, and there were no procedural safeguards.  The Court held 
that this violated the applicant’s Article 6(1) right.  However, the ECtHR have yet to 
decide whether, given the importance of the right to an impartial tribunal, it is possible 
for an applicant to waive this right even with appropriate safeguards.  By way of contrast, 
in the Suovaniemi case12, the Court considered that the fact that the applicants had been 
represented throughout the arbitration procedure ensured that the waiver of their right to 
impartial arbitrators by the applicants was accompanied by sufficient guarantees.  Whilst, 
the ECtHR has recognised the fundamental importance of the right of access to court it 
has also consistently stated that this right is not absolute and is subject to limitations13.  It 
would certainly seem unlikely, therefore, that an applicant who has been represented by 
legal counsel would be able to argue that there have been insufficient safeguards.  It 
would seem appropriate, however, to ensure that case management judges, legal 
representatives and mediators alike explain the binding effect of an agreement reached 
through an ADR procedure to ensure that the individuals concerned are aware that 
reaching such an agreement precludes further recourse to the courts on that issue, 
especially since lack of knowledge indicates that there is no unequivocal waiver. 
 
4) Absence of Constraint 
 
The ECtHR has stated that ‘too great an importance attaches to ‘the right to a court’ … 
for its benefit to be forfeited solely by reason of the fact that an individual is a party to a 
settlement reached in the course of a procedure ancillary to court proceedings … absence 
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of constraint is at all events one of the conditions to be satisfied’ (Deweer v Belgium)14.  
This aspect is, therefore, a crucial element.   
 
The ECtHR has given little guidance on what amounts to constraint.  In the seminal case 
of Deweer, the applicant was faced with the option of either paying a fine for the alleged 
offence of over-pricing his meat or with the closure of his business in 48 hours until a 
criminal hearing to determine his guilt.  He paid the fine but as a result had to forego the 
opportunity to prove his innocence at trial.  The Belgian Government argued that Mr 
Deweer had waived his right of access to the court through his acceptance of a friendly 
settlement.  However, the Court considered that the prospect of the loss of income due to 
the closure of his business over possibly several months, together with the consequent 
difficulties of paying staff and the potential loss of customers, amounted to compelling 
pressure to settle.  Additionally, whilst the applicant had an arguable defence, he faced 
the prospect of a much higher fine if found guilty at trial.   
 
The ECtHR did not, in the Deweer case, enunciate criteria for assessing constraint and 
there appears to have been little discussion of this point in subsequent cases.  The most 
significant feature in the Deweer case was the direct and potentially severe effect of the 
threat of closure.  A further feature may have been the immediacy of the threat.  
However, even if the threat of closure had been for six months’ time, arguably there 
would have been the same potentially severe effects. 
 
The situation in relation to court encouragement to undertake an ADR procedure is 
different.  First, there is no immediate threat to deprive a non-compliant individual of his 
business if he does not settle the claim.  Secondly, the individual is encouraged to 
undertake an ADR procedure – taking part in the process, whilst clearly aimed at 
encouraging settlement, is not necessarily going to lead to a settled claim.  However, as a 
result of the case management duty of the courts to encourage parties to undertake an 
ADR procedure, individuals arguably face two types of pressure: first, authoritative 
encouragement and secondly, the threat of an adverse costs award. 
 
a) Authoritative Encouragement 
 
This aspect encompasses advice received from legal representatives (who are themselves 
open to criticism from the court for failure to pursue this option15) as well as court 
encouragement.  There has been some unresolved debate in the case law as to whether 
court orders to undertake an ADR procedure could in themselves conflict with an 
individual’s right of access to court16, hence the courts have been careful not to order 
individuals to attend such processes17.  Despite such caution court encouragement may be 
robust.  For example, an ADR order issued by the Admiralty and Commercial Court 
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Whilst the encouragement of the court may be highly persuasive it would seem unlikely 
that this on its own would be sufficient to amount to constraint.  If an individual refuses 
to comply with the court’s suggestion or order he is not denied from pursuing his claim 
through the courts18.  However, parties who refuse to undertake ADR procedures where 
encouraged to do so run the risk of adverse costs. 
 
b) Adverse Costs Award 
 
According to Halsey v Milton Keynes General Trust NHS19, it is appropriate for a court to 
make an adverse costs award where a party has unreasonably refused (at the request of 
the court or another party) to undertake an ADR procedure.  The costs of legal 
proceedings in this jurisdiction are such that a party may prefer to compromise the claim 
rather than pursue his legal rights20.  The prohibitive nature of the cost of legal 
proceedings has itself been the subject of challenge before the ECtHR.  In such cases the 
applicant has alleged that the actual or potential costs of litigation have prevented him 
from either pursuing a claim through the courts or from advancing an effective action21.  
It is worth noting at this point that in such a situation the individual concerned has not 
been refused access to the courts, rather it is the direct or indirect effect of the lack of 
funds that acts as an impediment to the courts.  For example, in Steel & Morris v United 
Kingdom22, the ECtHR found that the applicants had been denied effective access to 
court where, due to the unavailability of legal aid, they had defended themselves in 
lengthy defamation proceedings against a large multi-national company.  It would seem 
unlikely that the ECtHR would have less sympathy for an applicant who has been unable 
to bring his claim at all due to lack of funding than for one who has advanced his cause 
ineffectively through the courts. 
 
The concern at this point, however, is not with whether a litigant is unable to advance or 
defend a claim due to lack of funding, but rather with whether a litigant, who undergoes 
an ADR procedure, may successfully argue that the pressure to undertake such a 
procedure constitutes constraint, thus countering the potential argument that in 
compromising the action through an ADR process he or she has waived his right of 
access to a court.  Lack of funds may constitute a significant factor in the pressure faced 
by individuals to avoid court proceedings, however, the possibility of an adverse costs 
award increases that pressure.  If adverse costs were automatically awarded for refusal to 
take part in an ADR process it would appear probable that the ECtHR would find, in 
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certain circumstances at least, this threat to constitute constraint: arguably (as in Deweer) 
such a threat would have direct and potentially severe financial consequences.  The 
consequences would not be as immediate as in the Deweer case, but the costs of legal 
proceedings may be as severe as losing one’s home or one’s business.   
 
However, in this context, unlike in the case of Deweer, adverse costs are not awarded 
automatically but are awarded where the court considers that an individual has 
unreasonably refused to undertake an ADR procedure.  The difficulty for an individual, 
making the decision to undertake an ADR procedure or to proceed to trial, is that an 
assessment of whether the refusal would be considered unreasonable at the costs hearing 
is not straightforward (particularly prior to the trial).   
 
The case of Halsey sets out guidelines for what constitutes unreasonable behaviour.  
Factors include the nature of the dispute, the merits of the claim, the prospects of success 
of the ADR procedure, the encouragement of the court, together with issues relating to 
expense and delay.  A number of issues arising from discussion of these factors make it 
uncertain for individuals to know when their refusal would be considered unreasonable23.  
For example, according to the Halsey guidance, a party’s reasonable belief that he has a 
strong case may be ‘sufficient justification for refusing to mediate’24.  However, whether 
the party’s belief in the strength of his case is reasonable is based on an objective 
assessment following the trial on the merits and, hence, is made with the benefit of 
hindsight.  Parties, prior to the hearing, may find it difficult to have the necessary 
objectivity.  For example, the court held in Burchell v Bullard25 that the defendant 
behaved unreasonably in believing his case was so watertight that he need not engage in 
attempts to settle.  This decision was based on judicial assessment of the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s belief with the benefit of hindsight following trial.  However, even 
following success at first instance it is not necessarily clear that the successful party’s 
belief in the strength of his case would be considered reasonable.  In Reed Executive v 
Reed26 an influential factor in the finding that the defendant had reasonably refused an 
invitation to mediate the dispute was his reasonable belief in the prospects of success of 
the appeal27.  The belief, with the benefit of hindsight, was held to be justified as the 
defendant had won his appeal.  However, he had been unsuccessful at first instance.  It is 
difficult for parties to proceedings to make objective assessments about the merits of their 
cases, particularly where emotionally involved or financially dependent on the outcome.  
A particularly illustrative example is provided by the case of Hurst v Leeming.   
 
In that case a solicitor pursued a claim (described as ‘hopeless’ by Lightman J) against 
his legal representative in previous proceedings.  Lightman J stated that:  
 
… it is plain that Mr. Hurst has been so seriously disturbed by the tragic course of events 
resulting from the dissolution of the partnership that his judgement in respect of matters 
concerning the partnership and partnership action and the conduct of that action on his 
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behalf is seriously disturbed: he is a person obsessed with the injustice which he considers 
has been perpetrated on him and is incapable of a balanced evaluation of the facts28 
 
Arguably, if a solicitor (caught as he was in the emotional throes of the life events which 
led to the court proceedings), is unable to make an objective or realistic assessment of the 
strength of his claim, how much more difficult is this for a lay person. 
 
This point is further illustrated by the case of Hickman v Blake Lapthorn 29.  This was a 
negligence claim against solicitors and counsel arising from a personal injury case.  Both 
defendants were themselves legal professionals, however, they had significantly different 
views of the value and strength of the defence.  Consequently, the first defendant wished 
to go to mediation, the second defendant did not, believing that the strength of the 
defence warranted trial. 
 
There are also difficulties with another aspect of the Halsey guidelines, that is, with 
assessing the prospects of success of a mediation process.  According to Halsey, a party 
unreasonably refuses to undertake an ADR procedure where that process would have 
reasonable prospects of success.  However, as the Court conceded in that case, ‘it may be 
difficult for the court to decide whether the mediation would have had a reasonable 
prospect of success’30.  Arguably, if the court is unable to make that assessment it is also 
problematic for the party to form an accurate opinion of the prospects of success.  The 
Court offered further comments on this point to the effect that some disputes were more 
intractable than others and some mediators more skilled than others31.  At the stage of 
choosing whether to go to mediation or run the risk of adverse costs through proceeding 
to trial the skill of the mediator or the willingness of each party to compromise may not 
be known. 
 
A further feature indicating unreasonable refusal is that of encouragement of the court.  
Where the court has encouraged parties to undertake an ADR procedure this may lead to 
a finding that the refusing party has acted unreasonably.  This is particularly the case 
where the encouragement of the court is robust.  Hence, for example, where the court 
gives an ADR order, a refusing party is likely to face an adverse costs award for refusal.   
At this point, the pressure to undertake an ADR procedure must be almost irresistible.  It 
is less certain whether a party will be considered to have refused unreasonably where the 
court adopts a less robust approach.  It would seem that the stronger the encouragement 
the more likely a party will be considered unreasonable for refusal to comply.  But since 
it is a matter degree it is difficult for an individual to assess the weight that will be 
accorded to this factor in an assessment of unreasonable refusal.    
 
It is clear that there are a number of uncertainties as to when a refusal to undertake an 
ADR procedure would be considered unreasonable.  This uncertainty does create 
additional pressure.  Arguably, the prospect of an adverse costs award (particularly where 
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this is accompanied by strong court encouragement) may constitute constraint.  The 
essence of waiver tainted by constraint is that the individual has no real choice as to 
whether to exercise a particular right.  Hence, the waiver of that right can not be 
considered voluntary.  The voluntary character of a decision depends on the level of 
freedom to choose.  To be a valid waiver there must be true choice to concede the 
particular right.  It is arguable that in certain circumstances an individual is denied a true 
choice in deciding to undertake an ADR procedure rather than proceeding to trial.   
 
B  The Margin of Appreciation 
 
In the Deweer case there was no discussion of whether the state’s constraint was 
justifiable.  The case was decided prior to the case of Ashingdane v United Kingdom32: 
the case in which the ECtHR introduced the concept of the margin of appreciation into its 
jurisprudence on Article 6(1).  In the event of a finding that the threat or actual award of 
adverse costs amounts to constraint, it would seem probable, therefore, that the ECtHR 
would consider whether its use was within the State’s margin of appreciation: that is 
whether the threat of adverse costs pursues a legitimate aim and is a proportionate means 
of achieving that aim. 
 
1) Legitimate Aim 
 
In relation to Article 6(1) the ECtHR seldom, if ever, finds that a measure does not 
pursue a legitimate aim.  In the context of civil justice applications, measures with the 
aim of enabling the general functioning of the civil justice system (for example, in 
ensuring the efficient use of court resources or for promoting expedition) are considered 
legitimate33.  Also, measures that restrict an individual’s right of access to court with the 
aim of protecting the rights of interests of others are also considered legitimate34. 
 
It is certainly arguable that the encouragement of parties to undertake ADR procedures 
enables the efficient administration of justice.  A key objective of the Woolf review of the 
civil justice system was to improve access to justice.  Arguably, use of ADR encourages 
a more efficient use of court resources.  In a system where court litigation is to be viewed 
as the last resort35, this contributes (alongside other methods encouraging settlement) to 
an efficient use of court resources, which is designed to ensure that limited court 
resources are available for those individuals who most need them and, hence, for those 
individuals access to justice is improved36.  Arguably, access to justice is therefore 
improved as the courts are not clogged with allegedly unnecessary litigation.  However, 
there is a further sense in which the use of ADR can be said to improve access to justice.  
This entails understanding justice in a broader sense than that understood when 
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considering access to the courts.  On this understanding justice encompasses dispute 
resolution brought about by alternative means – this may be relational justice (where the 
parties are able to continue in their relationship due to the compromise and discussion 
brought about by mediation, for example) or may be due to consumer satisfaction (where, 
for example, the parties are satisfied that their voice is heard in the process). 
 
The use of an ADR procedure may also be said to protect the interests of other parties in 
the litigation through, for example, the saving of expense or more speedy resolution of 
the claim37. 
 
It appears highly probable that the ECtHR would accept that the threat of adverse costs 
orders for unreasonable refusal to undertake an ADR procedure, together with court 
encouragement of such procedures, pursue legitimate aims.  The more interesting point 
for discussion is whether the Court would view its use as proportionate.   
 
2) Proportionate Means 
 
In the context of a claim that a measure has restricted an applicant’s right of access to 
court under Article 6(1), the ECtHR assesses whether there the measure adopted to 
achieve the particular aim is proportionate by balancing the general interest (for example, 
in enabling the general administration of justice) against the individual’s interest in 
vindicating his right before the courts.  In relation to whether a measure is proportionate 
to achieve its aim, the ECtHR scrutiny in relation to measures adopted to enable the 
general administration of justice or to protect the interests of others appears to be 
variable.  The most relevant cases to consider here are those where an applicant has been 
unable to bring or defend a claim for financial reasons (for example, due to the 
imposition of court fees or for refusal to hear an appeal without payment into court of the 
judgment debt). 
  
According to the ECtHR, administration of justice concerns may justify imposing 
financial restrictions on the right of access to court.  For example, there is no requirement 
to provide free legal proceedings38 and strict limitations may be put on access to appellate 
courts39 but, it should be noted that the ECtHR rarely finds that refusal to hear a claim or 
an appeal due to applicant’s inability to comply with a financial requirement is within a 
State’s margin of appreciation.  According to the ECtHR, restrictions of a financial nature 
should be subject to particularly rigorous scrutiny40.  For example, in certain Polish cases, 
where the applicant has been unable to have a court hearing due to an inability to pay the 
court fee, the ECtHR has adopted such a strict level of scrutiny that it has examined the 
fact findings of the national court and found that refusals to exempt payment have been 
based on an erroneous finding of facts41. The issue, according to the ECtHR, is that the 
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Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective, not theoretical 
and illusory42. 
 
In relation to the threat of adverse costs for unreasonable refusal to undertake an ADR 
procedure there are certain differences from the cases heard relating to financial 
restrictions.  First, the threat of adverse costs is not a direct financial impediment which 
acts as a barrier to entry to the courts as, for example, in the Polish cases.  In those cases 
the aim, however, of the fee was not to prevent entry but rather to derive income for the 
State or to cover the costs of proceedings.  In the case of the threat of adverse costs, this 
measure is designed to discourage entry.  The aim is to stop individuals from using the 
courts and to push them towards ADR.  Arguably, this threat acts as a fee to the extent 
that a potential litigant, facing the prospect of an adverse costs award following trial, is in 
reality posed with the threat that if he or she chooses to enter the court system he or she 
may have to pay a significant price to do so (albeit in terms of an adverse costs award 
made in favour of the opposing party rather than as a payment to the state for the 
privilege of using its resources).  Secondly, the threat of adverse costs is imposed not to 
generate income for the State but rather to protect the interests of the other party who has 
been to put to the expense of going to court when (s)he would have been prepared to 
undertake an ADR procedure.  However, there are other ways of protecting this interest 
(for example, a Part 36 offer).  Moreover, whilst this measure may serve to protect the 
interests of an opposing party, particularly where that party has expressed a desire to 
undertake an ADR procedure rather than pursue the claim or defence through the courts, 
the threat also serves to protect the interests of the state, in particular the objective of 
viewing litigation as a last resort in order to ensure the efficient use of limited court 
resources.  The more cases that can be turned away from the courts the fewer court 
resources the state has to provide. 
 
The ECtHR makes its assessment of whether a financial restriction has a disproportionate 
impact on an applicant in the light of the circumstances of the case: in particular, the 
applicant’s ability to pay appears to be the most significant factor but the ECtHR also 
considers the stage of proceedings at which the financial restriction was imposed43.  This 
latter aspect has a more variable influence.  Where the restriction prevents a first instance 
hearing it appears that the ECtHR has always found this is in violation of Article 6(1).  It 
is less certain that the ECtHR will find there has been a violation where the restriction 
imposed denies the applicant an appellate hearing. 
 
Hence, in deciding whether the threat of an adverse costs award is disproportionate, the 
financial circumstances of the applicant (including funding possibilities provided that 
these are not hypothetical44) are likely to be influential, particularly since the costs of 
litigation in this jurisdiction are so high.  It is more difficult to assess the impact of the 
stage of proceedings at which the threat is imposed since parties may be encouraged or 
requested to undertake ADR at various stages of proceedings.  Whilst the threat of an 
adverse costs order will most likely occur prior to the first instance hearing and, hence, in 
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situations a) and b) the applicant will not have that hearing, the threat is indirect, rather 
than direct.  As already mentioned, however, this threat is designed to discourage access 
to a court and it may be that the ECtHR will find that such impact is disproportionate. 
 
A further factor that the ECtHR may consider, should it be required to consider a claim of 
this nature, is whether the merits of the case or its prospects of success have been 
considered.  According to the ECtHR it adopts a particularly rigorous scrutiny where 
such restrictions (at least at the appellate stage) are completely unrelated to the merits of 
the claim or the prospects of the success45.  Where the State is able to demonstrate that 
the merits of the claim and the prospects of its success on appeal have been considered 
then the ECtHR appear more likely to accept that the financial restriction is 
proportionate46.  Where the national court has encouraged parties to undertake an ADR 
procedure it is possible, in deciding whether such encouragement is appropriate (in line 
with its case management duty47), that the court has considered the merits of the case 
(although a more significant consideration at that stage may be the prospects of success 
of the ADR procedure, rather than the prospects of success at trial).  But an adverse costs 
award may also be awarded where it is the opposing party who has requested an ADR 
procedure.  Where the court has not suggested this course of action then there would be 
no need for it to consider the merits of the case.  The important point is that at the stage 
when the party makes the decision whether to undertake an ADR procedure or run the 
risk of an adverse costs award the strength of the case may not be known.  Where there 
has been no suggestion that an individual is vexatious or that a statement of case should 
be struck out as disclosing no reasonable grounds for the action or there should be 
summary judgment for no reasonable prospects of success, then it would seem that there 
are no grounds for suggesting that an individual should not advance his or her case 
through the courts.  This point would seem pertinent to the fact that an adverse costs 
award will only be imposed where an individual’s refusal to undertake an ADR 
procedure is unreasonable.  Unreasonable refusal in this context cannot be equated to 
unreasonable behaviour in pursuing the action. 
 
It is uncertain how the ECtHR would respond to the fact that an individual is unable with 
certainty to predict when an adverse costs award would be awarded for refusal to 
undertake an ADR procedure.  But the ECtHR may consider that the uncertainty of the 
risk may lead a vulnerable party to undertake an ADR procedure when his or her strong 
preference may have been to go to court.  Hence, whilst it is not certain that the ECtHR 
would find the threat of an adverse costs award to be disproportionate, it is not beyond 
the realms of possibility.  The recent case of Stankov v Bulgaria48 adds further weight to 
the prospect that the ECtHR may find a violation of Article 6(1). 
 
II  DENIAL OF EFFECTIVE ACCESS TO THE COURT (SITUATION C) 
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In the Stankov case, the State imposed a fee of 4% of the value of the part of the claim on 
which the applicant failed.  This was imposed at the end of the hearing (as would be the 
situation with an adverse costs award).  According to the ECtHR, this rendered the right 
of access to court illusory and theoretical since it wiped out a significant proportion of the 
damages won49.  The Court reiterated that Article 6(1) is intended to guarantee rights that 
are practical and effective50.  The Court accepted that the imposition of the fee was 
compatible with the good administration of justice51 but in relation to assessing the 
proportionality of the restriction the Court commented that there had been no suggestion 
that the applicant’s claim was vexatious or exaggerated52 and that the claimant could not, 
therefore, be criticised for making the claim he did53.  The Court was concerned that the 
fee was imposed at the end of the trial rather than prior to the hearing and, therefore, 
considered that this removed the cautioning effect which there would have been had this 
been imposed at the outset54.  However, in this case, a further influential factor was the 
fact that the 4% fee was automatically imposed where a claimant failed in part, or all, of 
his claim.  Hence, there was no judicial discretion and no opportunity to waive or reduce 
the fees55.   
 
This case is relevant to a claim that the imposition of an adverse costs award, following 
success at trial, for unreasonable refusal to undertake an ADR procedure amounts to a 
restriction on the right of access to court.  In such a situation the adverse costs award 
would be imposed also at the end of the trial.  However, unlike in the Stankov case, there 
is judicial discretion as to whether to make such an award since it is imposed only for 
unreasonable refusal.  However, it must be feasible that the ECtHR would similarly 
consider that such an award amounted to a violation of Article 6(1), where the applicant’s 
claim was not vexatious or that the claimant could not be criticised for bringing or 
defending the claim, particularly if the costs award effectively wiped out the value of the 
claim and, hence, rendered his right illusory and theoretical.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The study of relevant ECtHR jurisprudence suggests that it is possible, in certain 
circumstances, that the ECtHR may find that the threat or actual imposition of an adverse 
costs award amounts to a violation of an individual’s right of access to court under 
Article 6(1).  This conclusion is enhanced by the fact that if the rhetoric about the 
advantages of ADR is accurate, then education and use over time ought to be sufficient to 
promote greater use.  It is worth noting also that research conducted in the Central 
London County Court suggests that where individuals feel pressurised into mediation, 
there is less likely to be a settlement as a result of the mediation56.  The use of a measure 
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that adversely impacts on an individual, and is not a particularly effective way of 
achieving a specific aim, is arguably disproportionate. 
